

**Perceptions of war and justice amongst Greek mobilisers:
The case of Iraq second warⁱ**

**Iosif Botetzagias^α & Moses Boudourides^β
University of Patras, Greece**

*Paper presented at the 'One Year Later: February 15 and the Global Antiwar
Movement' conference,
Bard College, USA, 27-28 March 2004*

WORK IN PROGRESS: SECOND DRAFT

(NOT REVIEWED BY A NATIVE SPEAKER)

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All comments are most welcomed!

Compiled: 1 March 2004

^α Research Assistant, University of Patras. Correspondence address: Mitr. Athanasiou 19, 49100 Corfu, Greece, e-mail: i_botetzagias@hotmail.com


^β Associate Professor, University of Patras. e-mail: mboudour@upatras.gr

ABSTRACT

This paper investigates the perceptions on war and justice amongst Greek mobilisers, taking as a case study the military intervention in Iraq. The data herein presented originates from research undertaken during the EU Summit meeting at Thessaloniki, Greece, during June 19-21, 2003. Although similar research is conducted by other research teams in different countries, our dataset differs in two important ways: First, the people interviewed were ‘activists’ and not the (possibly) one-off demonstrator. Thus, we hope to get an insight into the beliefs of a quite distinctive and rather under-researched social group. Second, at the time of research, the war in Iraq was effectively over, while other research was conducted prior or during the war. Accordingly, our results offer themselves to comparative assessment: namely, is there a time-effect on war’s perceptions and justification? Does (achieved) ‘success’ justify the ‘means’? Thus, we try to monitor the echo of Iraq war as juxtaposed to attitudes towards war in general. Finally, and since the mobilisations at Thessaloniki were staged by different groups which had, hitherto, avoided any co-operation, this paper examines to which extent this separation is due to each group’s distinctive socio-economic following or rather on resource mobilisation issues.

Researching the Greek alter-globalisation movement


Our team's research focuses on the Greek alter-globalisation movement. Thus, we have been monitoring the occurrence of protest events (PEs) concerning 'alter-globalisation' issues as reported in one major Greek daily, *Eleftherotypia* (Free Press), for the period January 1, 2003 to June 30, 2003¹. We have identified 778 relevant articles which offered us information on 554 distinct PEs. 271 of these PEs (or about 49% of the total) occurred in Greece and the following Graph demonstrates their evolution through time.



About a quarter of the Greek PEs was part of an international campaign or coordination plan while a bit less than 60% were organised at the local (sub-national) level. These mobilisations were almost entirely spurred by the Iraq war, aiming either to avoid it or to stop it. This becomes clear from the following graph, where we juxtapose the 'war' PEs to the 'remaining issues' ones².

¹ We have recently finished coding year 2002 and we are now coding PEs for the year 2001.

² Under the former category we have grouped together claims such as 'Stop the War'; 'Demand a UN resolution'; 'Peace'; 'Get out of Iraq'; and, 'End the Occupation'. At the 'remaining issues' category are included claims such as 'Against Neo-liberal Globalisation'; 'Against Capitalism/Market Economy'; 'For Immigrants rights'; 'For Work/Workers' rights'; 'Freedom/Against authority'; and, 'Social Rights/Justice/Democracy'.



The above graph seems to tell us is something we knew already: public interest on any specific issue withers away with time. Accordingly, the ‘war’ PEs, as reported in the newspaper we have been monitoring, almost but vanished by June 2003, a month after the ‘official’ end of the Iraq war.

Yet, as it will become evident in the following lines, such an appraisal can be misleading: when people protest, on any given subject, they do so for a variety of (personal) reasons which can extend beyond the organisers’ scope and much further than the journalists’ accounts of the event. The actual event that spurs people to get out in the streets, sign a petition, join a vigil offers but the *generic* framework for personal ‘participation’ and ‘action’ while it is the *individual’s micro-psychological* framework which attaches personal meanings and justifications to the specific event. In simpler words, we can mobilise together and still mobilise for different (set or prioritised) reasons. All these hold true *a fortiori* in the case of social movements which manage to group together a variety of distinct ‘culpable’ actors and targets into one ‘supra’ target: the movement against neo-liberal globalisation is but the latest example of this process.

The planned mobilisations during the EU Summit at Thessaloniki, Greece (June 2003) offered our research team a ‘cannot-miss’ opportunity to investigate the Greek

movement against globalisation. Furthermore, and since no research has been undertaken on the Greek antiwar demonstrations, we were hoping that the people mobilising at Thessaloniki would have also demonstrated against war a few months before, thus offering us an opportunity to investigate the movement's attitudes towards war.

As it turned out, this was more than a mere hope: as the following Table 1 shows, the vast majority of people we interviewed had participated in anti-war demonstrations. Furthermore, 73% of the respondents have participated in a demonstration within the last month: thus we have very good reasons to believe that Thessaloniki was but the culmination of the anti-war demonstration series of 2003.

Table 1: Past demonstrative activity (multiple answers)	
Topic	% of valid positive answers
<i>Antiwar</i>	93.5
Social/Syndical interest	72.5
Anti-globalisation	71.7
Antiracism	68.8
Human Rights	51.4
Local Interest	43.7
Environment	39.9
Third World	29.0
Women's Rights	22.5

Furthermore, this 'classic' anti-globalisation demonstration also had a strong anti-war connotation for those participating, as demonstrated in Table 2

Table 2: Reasons for mobilising at Thessaloniki (open ended question)	
Reasons given (merged categories)	% of total answers (N= 292)
Against War/USA/NATO	8.7
Against neo-liberal Globalisation	10.6
Against Racism	5.8
Against Imperialism-Capitalism/For Socialism-Revolution	11.6
Against EU/policies/leaders' decisions	14.4

The data collection and the respondents' profile

One of our research aims while designing the Thessaloniki project was to investigate the respondents' stance towards war (in general) and the Iraq war (in particular). Large scale research on the Iraq anti-war mobilisations was undertaken on the

occasion of the global February 15 demonstrations, by an international team of researchers coordinated by Stefaan Walgrave, yet not for Greece. In order to partly remedy the shortcoming, and lending our data open to comparisons, we have used a (partly) revised version of Walgrave team's questionnaire for our research. That said, one should not jump to the conclusion that the Greek results have but to merge into the larger dataset. The two research projects were undertaken at different times and within different frameworks. Furthermore, while Walgrave's team interviewed people while they were actually demonstrating, our team had visited the activists' main camping sites (the campus of the University, Velideion Conference Centre, Aghios Pavlos campus etc.), where the questionnaires were distributed over a four-day period (June 17 to June 20). Although we will not elaborate further, we have reasons to believe that the people we had interviewed were not the occasional lay-people who turn out for a demonstration: rather, they were individuals who were willing to spend a couple of days out in the open, in their tents³, or, to say the least, to be actively involved in the happenings *before* the major protest event. To that extent, this group of mobilisers could probably represent a distinctive '*meso-stratum*' of the movement, positioned in-between the generic public and the handful of movement entrepreneurs.

In total we have managed to collect approx. 180 questionnaires, 148 of which were answered by Greek respondents. The questionnaires were filled in on the spot, under the control of the interviewers. No specific guidance on sampling techniques was given to the interviewers: rather, they were encouraged to cruise the camps approaching every single individual they came across. Accordingly, our sample consists of those individuals present at the specific camps, on the selected dates and times, thus the results of our analysis should not be extrapolated to the generic public which mobilised/demonstrated during these days.

The basic demographic data on the respondents are presented in Tables 3 to 7. Our sample is evenly divided between male and female respondents. Locals of Thessaloniki dominate the sample, while it consists of young people (younger than thirty), with high academic qualifications, predominantly students; those active in the

³ That said, one should be cautious in interpreting our findings, since not all the interviewees were staying out in the open; the majority were local inhabitants (actually only 26% were not from Thessaloniki).

workforce are mainly highly skilled, employed at the private sector, especially at the fields of services and education.

Table 3

Age cohort

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Over 50	7	4,7	4,8	4,8
	Between 40 and 50	5	3,4	3,4	8,3
	Between 30 and 40	15	10,1	10,3	18,6
	Between 20 and 30	98	66,2	67,6	86,2
	Younger than 20	20	13,5	13,8	100,0
	Total	145	98,0	100,0	
Missing	System	3	2,0		
Total		148	100,0		

Table 4

In what kind of business do you work

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Private Sector	40	27.0	44.4	44.4
	Public Sector	22	14.9	24.4	68.9
	Charitable/Voluntary organisations	4	2.7	4.4	73.3
	Other/Never worked	24	16.2	26.7	100.0
	Total	90	60.8	100.0	
Missing	System	58	39.2		
Total		148	100.0		

Table 5

Kind of employment

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Professional/Highly Technical	9	6.1	6.6	6.6
	Manager/Senio Administrator	3	2.0	2.2	8.8
	Clerical	31	20.9	22.8	31.6
	Sales/Services	16	10.8	11.8	43.4
	Skilled Manual Worker	3	2.0	2.2	45.6
	Semi-skilled/Unskilled manual worker	11	7.4	8.1	53.7
	Have not worked	51	34.5	37.5	91.2
	Other	12	8.1	8.8	100.0
	Total	136	91.9	100.0	
Missing	System	12	8.1		
Total		148	100.0		

Table 6

Employed in sector

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Primary sector (agriculture/fishery etc)	5	3.4	5.9	5.9
	Secondary Sector (Industry/Mining/Building etc.)	4	2.7	4.7	10.6
	Education	19	12.8	22.4	32.9
	Health/Social Care	8	5.4	9.4	42.4
	Media	3	2.0	3.5	45.9
	Other Public Sector	8	5.4	9.4	55.3
	Banking/Finance etc.	2	1.4	2.4	57.6
	Other Services	22	14.9	25.9	83.5
	Other	14	9.5	16.5	100.0
	Total	85	57.4	100.0	
Missing	System	63	42.6		
Total		148	100.0		

Table 7

Highest education degree achieved

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Primary education	1	.7	.7	.7
	Secondary education (Gymnasium)	3	2.0	2.1	2.8
	Secondary education (Lyceum)	12	8.1	8.3	11.1
	IEK/College	2	1.4	1.4	12.5
	University	107	72.3	74.3	86.8
	M.Sc., M.A.	14	9.5	9.7	96.5
	Ph.D.	4	2.7	2.8	99.3
	Other	1	.7	.7	100.0
	Total	144	97.3	100.0	
Missing	System	4	2.7		
Total		148	100.0		

Further analysis into the beliefs of our group, demonstrates important deviations from the generic Greek public opinion⁴. As Table 8 demonstrates, this group places very low level of trust on a number of civic institutions, save the case of ‘Trade Unions’ and ‘Political parties’. Furthermore, they exhibit a high level of dissatisfaction with the way democracy operates both at home and at the EU level (Tables 9 & 10)

⁴ In the following tables we have placed our results in-between the Greek national mean values as reported in two Eurobarometer studies: the EB 59 (Spring 2003) and EB 60 (Autumn 2003). A note of caution is necessary: while in the Eurobarometer studies the respondents were asked to indicate which institution they ‘tend to trust’ or ‘tend to distrust’ (a dichotomous option), in our survey we have used a finer categorisation, ranging from ‘Trust a lot’ to ‘Trust the least/Do not trust at all’. Thus, in Table 8 we have collapsed three categories (‘trust a lot’; ‘trust much’; and, ‘trust enough’) into one

Table 8: Institutions Greek respondents 'tend to trust' (%)			
	EB 59, N= 1003 (Spring 2003)	Thessaloniki, N=148 (June 2003)	EB 60, N=1001 (Autumn 2003)
Judicial System	69	12.9	68
Police	68	2.0	67
EU parliament	62	6.0	67
Church (institutions)	63	2.1	60
Radio	54	6.1 ⁵	55
Printed press	44		54
TV	43		48
National Parliament	56	10.8	54
National government	43	3.4	47
Trade Unions	44	56.8	44
UN ⁶	31	9.5	36
Political parties	17	21.7	20

Table 9: Satisfaction with way democracy operates in GREECE				
	A lot satisfied	Fairly satisfied	Not that much/ (A bit) satisfied	Least / (Not at all) satisfied
EB 59	9	40	38	13
Thessaloniki	0	0.7	20.9	73.7
EB 60	11	43	35	10

Table 10: Satisfaction with way democracy operates in the EU				
	A lot satisfied	Fairly satisfied	Not that much/ (A bit) satisfied	Least / (Not at all) satisfied
EB 59	8	42	29	9
Thessaloniki	0	1.4	15.5	80.4
EB 60	9	44	28	7

⁵ Our questionnaire referred to 'Media' in general


⁶ The trust placed on the UN by Greeks is, through time, persistently lower than the EU-15 average

However, the perceived ‘democracy deficit’ has no influence on electoral participation: if we control for those unable to vote in the last Greek parliamentary election (April 2000), we observe a weak and insignificant correlation between ‘satisfaction with democracy’ and voting (or not) (Kendall’s tau-c -0.108, approx. sig. 0.136). As far as the party voted for at the last general election, although the response rate is very low (around 19%), those who did cast a ballot and did answer our question seem evenly split between the two major Greek Left parties: *KKE* (the Communist Party of Greece) and *SYN* (the Coalition for the Left and Progress)⁷. It is an interesting fact that the two major Greek political parties, the Socialists (*PASOK*) and the Conservatives (*New Democracy*), cannot be traced within this sample, albeit securing between them around 80% of the vote in every single Greek general election of the past 20 years.

Thus, we have strong reasons to believe that this is a sample of a strong leftist lenience. That said, one should not dismiss the following presentation of these people’s views on war as but the usual Greek-left critique on US policies. As a matter of fact, these demonstrations were riding a huge wave of public discontent, both at home and at the EU level, concerning the US. As the following graph demonstrates⁸, comparing the differences between ‘positive’ and ‘negative appraisals of the US role on fighting terrorism and peace in the world, the Greek public held highly negative opinions, far in excess of the EU mean scores.

⁷ In its May 2003 convention, *SYN* renamed itself into ‘Coalition for the Left, the Ecology and the Social Movements’.

⁸ Data originates from the Eurobarometer studies EB 58 (Autumn 2002); EB 59 (Spring 2003); and, EB 60 (Autumn 2003)



Under this light it should not come as a surprise that a Flash Eurobarometer survey (October 2003), reported that an amazing 96% of Greek respondents thought the military intervention in Iraq ‘was not justified’⁹ or that 88% of Greeks thought that the US ‘poses a threat to peace in the world’ –followed by Israel (61%)- and way ahead of typical ‘axis-of-evil’ countries, such as North Korea (30%), Iran (26%), Syria (17%) or Libya (13%)¹⁰.

The issue of war

Our questionnaire included two questions on war, the first focusing on the Iraq War, while the second dealt with war in general. The format of these questions were as follows, while the respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement on a five-point scale, ranging from ‘Agree a lot’ to ‘Disagree a lot’

⁹ Flash Eurobarometer 151 (October 2003), *Iraq and Peace in the World*. The EU mean was 68% while 82% (and 41% of EU-15) believed the military intervention was ‘not at all justified’

¹⁰ The EU-15 scores are: USA (53%); Israel (59%-top of the list); North Korea (53%); Iran (53%); Syria (37%); and. Libya (36%).

Table 11 : Iraq War questions
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • It was part of a US-led crusade against Islam.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A war against Iraq would have been justified only if authorized by the UN Security Council.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The USA wanted to invade Iraq to secure their national oil supply.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • It was a racist war.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi regime were a threat to world peace.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Iraqi regime had to be brought down to end the suffering of the Iraqi people.

Table 12: Generic questions about war
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A war is justified if aiming to bring down a dictatorial regime.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A war is justified if aiming to redress an ill (e.g. to expel an occupation force, to fight back an invading army)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • War is always unjustified.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Due to human nature, war is inevitable
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • War occurs due to interests, not values

It is interesting to note that not all respondents were happy with the coding scheme we had provided: there existed (albeit a few) cases where they declined to accept any of the available answers but rather penned into the questionnaire their own responses. In the Iraq war question, the only statement which provoked the respondents' reaction was the one reading 'the Iraq regime had to come down in order to stop the suffering of the Iraqi people'. Around 6% of the respondents highlighted that this was *not* done by the Iraqi people themselves, indicating that for them a clear line has to be drawn between popular uprisings and foreign intervention. On the generic war question, the 'personal' answers are more evenly spread, scoring from 1.5 to 4.5% of the total responses given, yet they generally highlight the difference between 'a liberating'; 'indigenous'; 'popular'; and/or 'class' war and 'imperialistic' wars (the former being condoned, of course). Tables 13 to 23 show the results for all the questions:

Table 13

Iraq War-Crusade

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Agree a lot	8	5,4	6,1	6,1
	Agree	24	16,2	18,3	24,4
	Neither agree nor disagree	27	18,2	20,6	45,0
	Disagree	37	25,0	28,2	73,3
	Disagree a lot	34	23,0	26,0	99,2
	Something else	1	,7	,8	100,0
	Total	131	88,5	100,0	
Missing	System	17	11,5		
Total		148	100,0		

Table 14

Iraq War-Justified only through UN

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Agree	5	3,4	3,7	3,7
	Neither agree nor disagree	8	5,4	6,0	9,7
	Disagree	26	17,6	19,4	29,1
	Disagree a lot	95	64,2	70,9	100,0
	Total	134	90,5	100,0	
Missing	System	14	9,5		
Total		148	100,0		

Table 15

Iraq War-USA wanted the oil

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Agree a lot	79	53,4	56,4	56,4
	Agree	51	34,5	36,4	92,9
	Neither agree nor disagree	5	3,4	3,6	96,4
	Disagree a lot	3	2,0	2,1	98,6
	Something else	2	1,4	1,4	100,0
	Total	140	94,6	100,0	
Missing	System	8	5,4		
Total		148	100,0		

Table 16

Iraq War-It was racist

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Agree a lot	5	3,4	3,8	3,8
	Agree	17	11,5	12,9	16,7
	Neither agree nor disagree	35	23,6	26,5	43,2
	Disagree	45	30,4	34,1	77,3
	Disagree a lot	30	20,3	22,7	100,0
	Total	132	89,2	100,0	
Missing	System	16	10,8		
Total		148	100,0		

Table 17

Iraq War-Saddam a threat to world peace

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Agree	5	3,4	3,8	3,8
	Neither agree nor disagree	25	16,9	19,1	22,9
	Disagree	52	35,1	39,7	62,6
	Disagree a lot	48	32,4	36,6	99,2
	Something else	1	,7	,8	100,0
	Total	131	88,5	100,0	
Missing	System	17	11,5		
Total		148	100,0		

Table 18

Iraq War-Had to stop the suffering of Iraqi people

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Agree a lot	1	,7	,8	,8
	Agree	12	8,1	9,0	9,8
	Neither agree nor disagree	38	25,7	28,6	38,3
	Disagree	31	20,9	23,3	61,7
	Disagree a lot	43	29,1	32,3	94,0
	Something else	8	5,4	6,0	100,0
	Total	133	89,9	100,0	
Missing	System	15	10,1		
Total		148	100,0		

Table 19

War-Justified when bringing down a dictator

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Agree a lot	5	3,4	3,8	3,8
	Agree	20	13,5	15,4	19,2
	Neither agree nor disagree	19	12,8	14,6	33,8
	Disagree	39	26,4	30,0	63,8
	Disagree a lot	40	27,0	30,8	94,6
	Something else	7	4,7	5,4	100,0
	Total	130	87,8	100,0	
Missing	System	18	12,2		
Total		148	100,0		

Table 20

War-Justified when redressing an ill

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Agree a lot	12	8,1	9,3	9,3
	Agree	38	25,7	29,5	38,8
	Neither agree nor disagree	25	16,9	19,4	58,1
	Disagree	22	14,9	17,1	75,2
	Disagree a lot	25	16,9	19,4	94,6
	Something else	7	4,7	5,4	100,0
	Total	129	87,2	100,0	
Missing	System	19	12,8		
Total		148	100,0		

Table 21

War-Always unjustified

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Agree a lot	35	23,6	27,6	27,6
	Agree	27	18,2	21,3	48,8
	Neither agree nor disagree	29	19,6	22,8	71,7
	Disagree	26	17,6	20,5	92,1
	Disagree a lot	8	5,4	6,3	98,4
	Something else	2	1,4	1,6	100,0
	Total	127	85,8	100,0	
Missing	System	21	14,2		
Total		148	100,0		

Table 22

War-Inevitable due to human nature

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Agree a lot	4	2,7	3,1	3,1
	Agree	12	8,1	9,4	12,5
	Neither agree nor disagree	16	10,8	12,5	25,0
	Disagree	39	26,4	30,5	55,5
	Disagree a lot	55	37,2	43,0	98,4
	Something else	2	1,4	1,6	100,0
	Total	128	86,5	100,0	
Missing	System	20	13,5		
Total		148	100,0		

Table 23

War-It occurs due to interests, not values

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Agree a lot	83	56,1	63,8	63,8
	Agree	24	16,2	18,5	82,3
	Neither agree nor disagree	13	8,8	10,0	92,3
	Disagree	6	4,1	4,6	96,9
	Disagree a lot	2	1,4	1,5	98,5
	Something else	2	1,4	1,5	100,0
	Total	130	87,8	100,0	
Missing	System	18	12,2		
Total		148	100,0		

As it follows from above tables, the respondents overwhelmingly believed this was a war for oil (approx. 93%). The Alliance’s claims that Saddam was a threat to global peace or that his fall was necessary to end the misery of the Iraqi people failed to make an impression, similar to claims that this was a Crusade against Islam or a racist war. The most interesting finding is the utter rejection of the UN as a mean for war legitimisation¹¹, especially since this was a point which many European governments had highlighted while opposing the US intervention in Iraq. Nevertheless, this should not come as a surprise if one takes into account the low level of trust placed on UN by these individuals (see Table 8).

The respondents’ answers to both sets of questions demonstrate a high level of consistency, shown in the two following tables, although in the Iraq question the situation is more complex, pointing towards a possible ‘merging’ between moral judgements and rational decisions (such as the relatively high, and significant, correlation between the Iraq war as a crusade, on one hand, and Saddam as a threat to world peace, on the other)

Table 24: Correlations for Iraq war questions

			Correlations					
			Iraq War-Crusade	Iraq War-Justified only through UN	Iraq War-USA wanted the oil	Iraq War-It was racist	Iraq War-Saddam a threat to world peace	Iraq War-Had to stop the suffering of Iraqi people
Kendall's tau_b	Iraq War-Crusade	Correlation Coefficient	1,000	,267**	,082	,433**	,318**	,263**
		Sig. (2-tailed)	,	,000	,286	,000	,000	,000
		N	131	131	131	130	128	130
	Iraq War-Justified only through UN	Correlation Coefficient	,267**	1,000	,113	,233**	,389**	,300**
		Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	,	,165	,002	,000	,000
		N	131	134	134	132	131	133
	Iraq War-USA wanted the oil	Correlation Coefficient	,082	,113	1,000	-,009	,087	-,099
		Sig. (2-tailed)	,286	,165	,	,903	,275	,199
		N	131	134	140	132	131	133
	Iraq War-It was racist	Correlation Coefficient	,433**	,233**	-,009	1,000	,264**	,139
		Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	,002	,903	,	,000	,058
		N	130	132	132	132	129	131
	Iraq War-Saddam a threat to world peace	Correlation Coefficient	,318**	,389**	,087	,264**	1,000	,359**
		Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	,000	,275	,000	,	,000
		N	128	131	131	129	131	130
	Iraq War-Had to stop the suffering of Iraqi people	Correlation Coefficient	,263**	,300**	-,099	,139	,359**	1,000
		Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	,000	,199	,058	,000	,
		N	130	133	133	131	130	133

** - Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).

¹¹ The scores are: 71% ‘disagreeing strongly’ while 20% ‘disagreeing’. This pattern holds across sex,

Table 25: Correlations for generic war questions

			Correlations				
			War-Justified when bringing down a dictator	War-Justified when redressing an ill	War-Always unjustified	War-Inevitable due to human nature	War-It occurs due to interests, not values
Kendall's tau_b	War-Justified when bringing down a dictator	Correlation Coefficient	1,000	,567**	-,307**	,197**	-,191*
		Sig. (2-tailed)	,	,000	,000	,009	,014
		N	130	124	122	124	123
	War-Justified when redressing an ill	Correlation Coefficient	,557**	1,000	-,350**	,115	-,174*
		Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	,	,000	,124	,023
		N	124	129	123	124	123
	War-Always unjustified	Correlation Coefficient	-,307**	-,350**	1,000	,170*	,310**
		Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	,000	,	,023	,000
		N	122	123	127	124	125
	War-Inevitable due to human nature	Correlation Coefficient	,197**	,115	,170*	1,000	-,044
		Sig. (2-tailed)	,009	,124	,023	,	,572
		N	124	124	124	128	127
	War-It occurs due to interests, not values	Correlation Coefficient	-,191*	-,174*	,310**	-,044	1,000
		Sig. (2-tailed)	,014	,023	,000	,572	,
		N	123	123	125	127	130

** . Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).

* . Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed).


Yet, the main idea behind providing our respondents with two, clear cut, sets of questions was to assess to which extent the Iraq war fitted into the respondent's generic ideas on war. To that extent, we cross-tabulated the different statements of the two sets of questions and, again, the results demonstrate a high level of consistency. In other words, taking as a starting point the respondents' beliefs about war in general, one can guess quite accurately their stance towards the Iraq war. Thus, there exists a small yet significant correlation between the statement 'war is justified when bringing down a dictator' and the statements (a) 'Saddam was a threat to world peace' (Kendall's tau-b 0.228, sig. 0.002) and (b) 'The Iraqi regime had to be overthrown for ending the suffering of the Iraqi people' (Kendall's tau-b 0.296, sig. 0.000). A similar correlation exists between 'war is justified when redressing an ill' and the 'people suffering category' (Kendall's tau-b 0.200, sig. 0.004). Also, for those viewing war as 'always unjustified', there exists a small, significant correlation with the views describing the Iraq war as a 'crusade' (Kendall's tau-b 0.195, sig. 0.004) or as 'racist' (Kendall's tau-b 0.263, sig. 0.000), linking the occurrence of 'war' to 'irrational' and/or 'primitive' motives. The only 'peculiar' finding is that there exists no correlation between the statement 'war occurs due to interests, not values' and any statement concerning the war on Iraq, contrary to our expectations for a strong, positive correlation at least with the 'war for oil' scenario. Further analysis is deemed necessary on this point.

age and education groups


The groups' perceptions

As we have mentioned at the beginning of this paper, our research at Thessaloniki is part of general research on the Greek alter-globalisation movement. Our research to date has revealed that, contrary to most other countries, the Greek alter-globalisation organisations seem not to cooperate: in other words, we can identify at least two major camps of organisations which tend to mobilise/protest on their own and even to organise competing events (on the same issue and on the same date yet at different places). This becomes clear if one views the networks of 'co-participating' and 'anti-participating' social movement organisations for the first semester of 2003: two 'alliances' emerge, one structured around the Greek Social Forum (and *SYN*) while the other arranged in relation to *KKE*. The fact that the 'anti-participating' network exhibits a considerable greater density than the 'co-participating' one, supports our claim that antithesis rather than co-operation is the alter-globalisation social movement organisations network's main characteristic.

Graph 4: Co-Participating Orgs Network, N=46, Density=0.3043



Graph 5: ‘Anti’-Participating Orgs Network, N=46, Density: 0.5729



The mobilisations at Thessaloniki were no exception: the major Greek social groups decided to demonstrate on their own. It would, then, be interesting to investigate to what extent this decision reflects any major differences in their members’ perceptions on war (in general) and the war in Iraq (in particular). In order to link the respondents’ answers to group affiliation, we had asked our respondents to name the group they were to march along at Thessaloniki. Out of 74% participating/demonstrating with a group of some kind, only 46% did write down the group’s name: for the need of our analysis the different groupings were recoded into: ‘*Social Forum*’¹², ‘*Drassi*’¹³, ‘*Initiative*’¹⁴ and ‘*Other*’¹⁵. Running the cross-tabulations for group membership and several statements about the war, we observe a medium yet significant association between group membership and whether ‘war is always unjustified’ (Cramer’s $V=0.293$, Sig. 0.000); whether ‘war is justified when bringing down a dictator’ (Cramer’s $V=0.266$, Sig. 0.004); and, whether ‘war is justified when redressing an ill’

¹² Including answers such as ‘Social Forum’, ‘SYN’, ‘SYN Youth Branch’ and ‘DEA’. We consider this group to be pre-disposed towards SYN (the Greek New Left party).

¹³ Including answers such as ‘Drassi’, ‘KKE’, ‘KKE Youth Branch’. We consider this group to be pre-disposed towards KKE (the Greek Communist party).

¹⁴ Including answers such as ‘Initiative Thessaloniki 2003’. We consider this group to be pre-disposed towards the extra parliamentary Left.

¹⁵ Any other answer

(Cramer's $V= 0.337$, Sig. 0.000). Thus, although such a claim has to be further investigated, the results point towards different perceptions concerning war and justice between the different groups. Could, then, follow that these differences would also re-emerge at the Iraq war case? Contrary to what one might have expected, this was not the case. All cross-tabulations on the Iraq war questions showed no significant correlations.

This finding bears two important conclusions: first, the Iraq war was universally condemned by the Greek activists regardless of group-affiliation, a result in perfect accordance with the generic public feeling in Greece towards this war. Second, and more interesting, it seems that there was no reason for the major Greek anti-war alliances to opt for a non-cooperative approach on the Iraq issue. Their followers shared an amazing consensus both between themselves and when compared to the 'general' public (the 'no group mentioned' category).

The latter is indeed a peculiar finding –and actually one our team was intuitively expecting to monitor-. Since, if there is no 'theoretical' reason for acting separately, one has to account for the split in the Greek anti-war (and alter-globalisation) movement. We are not going to elaborate much further into this point –which in any case escapes the scope of the present paper- yet it could be the case that the split experienced by the movement is actually the outcome of intra-movement conflict for hegemony. If one takes into account that the two major political parties behind the anti-war/anti-globalisation umbrella organizations (these are the *Social Forum/SYN* and *DRASSI Thessaloniki 2003/KKE* pairs) have spent the better part of the nineties (or, one should say, ever since the restoration of the democracy in 1974) trying to secure the leadership of the Greek Left, it could well be the case that we are witnessing but the latest episode of this leftist war for supremacy, cloaked under 'modern' and 'up-to-date' anti-war and alter-globalisation slogans.

ⁱ Earlier discussions can be found at: <http://nicomedia.math.upatras.gr/conf/CAWM2003/papers.php3>: Botetzagias I., Boudourides M. & Kalamaras D. (2003), *Perceptions of War and Justice among Greek*

Protesters: The Case of the Second Iraq War, and Kalamaras D., Botetzagias I. & Boudourides M. (2003), *Anti-Globalisation and Anti-War Protest Events during the First Half of 2003: Analysis of data from the Greek newspaper 'Eleftherotypia'*.